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Abstract
Present American policy proclaims the compatibility of drone usage with
the traditional Rules of Engagement and the Laws of War. Largely absent
in this is an examination of how enemy combatants are being defined on
both sides of drone activity: not just the targets and operators but also
the relevance of drone technology proliferation. This work engages the
void to reveal inconsistent and contradictory ethical standards in
American drone policy, based largely on an assumed continued technical
preeminence that is by no means guaranteed. The argument is not a
humanitarian lament against hegemony: it is a realist argument
addressing how ethical inconsistencies in defining American
technological warfare compromise the ‘leadership high ground’ for the
United States in a manner that carries fairly significant national security
blowback potential.
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Introduction 
Present American policy proclaims the compatibility of drone usage with 
traditional Rules of Engagement and the Laws of War. Some initial analytical 
criticism is beginning to challenge how drones are used empirically and to a 
lesser degree asking theoretical and ethical questions from such evidence. Largely 
absent in this debate is an examination of how enemy combatants are being 
defined on both sides of drone activity (not just the targets and operators but also 
the relevance of drone technology proliferation) and how the inexorable spread of 
technological innovation around the globe might impact these issues. Perhaps 
most important: could a forced application of the Laws of War to drone usage 
backfire against American interests as the rest of the world catches up in drone 
technology? By focusing on this aspect of the debate, the work reveals 
inconsistent, secret, and contradictory ethical standards in American drone 
engagement policy, based largely on a desired continued technical preeminence 
that can by no means be guaranteed. This argument is not a humanitarian lament 
against United States hegemony. Rather, it is a realist argument addressing how 
ethical inconsistencies in defining aspects of American technological warfare 
leave the U.S. potentially compromised in a manner that carries fairly significant 
national security blowback. In short, as the technical capability gap closes 
between the United States and its adversaries, the timeframe shortens for when 
America’s “ethical chickens may come home to roost.”  
 
This article takes issue with the idea that ethics, transparency, and normalized 
standards cannot have an impact on the emerging drone environment. Some 
audiences in the United States believe that they should simply take advantage of 
the technical superiority for as long as it lasts and then, when such advantage no 
longer applies, fall back to the tried and true military methods of defense and 
deterrence to stave off challenges and threats. The only problem with this 
thought process is that the ethical double-standard inherent to early American 
drone dominance might be in fact causing the future problems that then have to 
be remedied by traditional military applications. This is unacceptable. It is not so 
much that ethical standards and transparent rules destroy threats: it is that a 
system of ethical consistency and norms standardization might prevent the 
emergence of such threats to begin with. To ignore or dismiss this idea is akin to 
blocking all of the potential impact of international norms on drones to the 
unfortunate detriment of American national security.  
 
While the United States has an obligation to its people, and especially its military 
service members, to develop capabilities that increase the likelihood of mission 
success while decreasing American casualties, the somewhat fantastical success 
of drone strikes gave rise to some awkward but important considerations: if the 
United States becomes so skilled at waging war from a distance, then has a vital 
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brake on militarism and war-waging been lost?1 With drones, being used by both 
the military and intelligence community, is there a unified code of behavior, use, 
and standards? Who is ultimately responsible if secret missions go awry or 
mistakes are made? In general, the military has employed a fairly strict code of 
conduct and responsibility across traditional forms of warfare.2 This has not 
always seemed to be the case with drone usage by the Intelligence Community, 
where the general nature of intelligence activity and Top Secret/Sensitive 
Compartmented Information classifications make operations shrouded in 
secrecy. While the President and Department of Defense clearly have defined 
roles in the process of targeting and establishing restrictions, the perception 
persists that American drone use is largely beyond societal review. The 
psychological aspect of extensive drone usage is also gaining momentum in 
scholarly and policy circles. Some consider drones to be the epitome of numbed 
technological violence, perhaps covering over the central truth of war being not 
just about killing but also about death and dying.3 
 
More important to this research, however, is a lesser-emphasized discussion 
about how drone warfare has been awkwardly ‘force-fed’ into the general Laws of 
War/Rules of Engagement discussion. There seems to be a bit of American 
foreign policy hubris, where the objective of continued technological dominance 
is allowing for some rather problematic ethical interpretations. Let us consider 
the drone ‘pilot’: is s/he a combatant or non-combatant? At present, the official 
answer is ‘yes and no’: while sitting in the command chair and operating the 
joystick, regardless of location, the drone pilot is indeed a combatant. However, 
when the pilot clocks off and leaves his/her base, sits down in their Toyota Camry 
and drives to Taco Bell for a quick lunch, the pilot, depending on whom one asks, 
either becomes a traditional off-duty combatant like any other off-duty 
combatant in a forward area, or, miraculously transforms into a non-combatant 
civilian and cannot be targeted legally. The reason for this divergence may be 
largely because of the still vague and non-distinct classifications given to drone 
pilots working for the military versus ones working for the Intelligence 
Community. This lack of clarity, even while accepting the Intelligence 
Community’s need and desire for secrecy, can eventually cause blowback because 
of ethical inconsistency. The drone pilot status is based not on the Rules of 
Engagement, Laws of War, Geneva Conventions, or any other major international 
legal act or tradition. It is based solely on the fact that the United States at 
present has de facto exclusive advanced militarized drone technology and keeps 
                                                          
1 Anonymous, “Leaders: Drones and the Man – The ethics of warfare,” The Economist, 
July 30, 2011.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Robert Jay Lifton, "The dimensions of contemporary war and violence: How to reclaim 
humanity from a continuing revolution in the technology of killing," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 69:4 (2013). 
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secret whatever ethical or legal frameworks it uses to govern such technology. 
The Obama administration claims the need for secrecy, and in certain 
intelligence/military operations, this can be justified. But there are definitely 
consequences to a system that uses secrecy as a denial of ethical transparency, 
especially when it concerns technology that is quickly being distributed and 
developed all over the world, amongst friend and foe alike.  
 
It might behoove the United States to worry about creating universal ethical 
standards or operating under standardized and transparent ethical norms. The 
flexibility of drone pilot combatant status, for example, would have stark 
repercussions for the United States were it applied in other arenas: is a Taliban 
fighter a combatant as he drives and parks a car bomb next to an Afghan police 
station but then becomes a civilian when he returns home and has dinner with 
his family in Kabul? The question of course sounds ridiculous but is in fact an 
accurate application of American drone pilot ‘secret ethics’ if such ethics were 
universalized today. The repercussions become more problematic as countries—
which use drone 'standards' set largely by the United States— become more 
aggressive in acquiring and developing their own drone capabilities.  
 
Drones are becoming an increasingly important and fascinating subject of 
investigation, whether it is in the fields of foreign policy, intelligence studies, 
military affairs, science and technology or ethics. This article takes a holistic 
approach, looking at aspects of current drone use and application, legal acts and 
international law customs as they apply to drone technology, the increasingly 
large body of scholarly voices coming out against drones that are then countered 
by highly-respected organizations seeking ways to responsibly govern drones in 
conflict situations, and finally the proliferation of drone technology and how 
countries around the world are developing new capabilities. When taken in 
concert it becomes more readily apparent how this Pandora’s presumption—a 
possibly foolhardy assumption of American technological dominance in 
perpetuity—is not only dangerous but also unlikely. Letting American drone 
technology be ‘governed’ by loose and internally contradictory ethical rules could 
signal a new kind of tech-war in the near future, leaving all of the United States, 
its interests, and its population at risk, as other adversarial countries and 
intelligence communities acquire the technology. 
 
Reviewing the Field: Formal Law and Blurred Lines with Drones 
There are two major forces working in contradistinction to each other when it 
comes to U.S. policy on drone development. First, the U.S. Air Force has a clear 
and explicit objective to have the leanest, most adaptable, most powerful 
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems in the world.4 Second, most of the 
pertinent legal questions that could constrain this objective are still openly 
debated. For example, much of the original foundation for U.S. drone 
development came from Israel. In December 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court 
(ISC) arrived at four main conclusions about drones and their place in conflict: 
• The laws of war are applicable to the armed conflict between Israel and 
terrorist organizations operating in the region. The ISC qualified the 
conflict as an international armed conflict, even though no other states 
were involved. 
• Targeted killing (the preventative elimination of terrorists) cannot 
always be deemed legal nor can these actions always be deemed illegal. 
• The legality of targeted killings is contingent upon the fact that civilians 
are not protected from attacks for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.  
• The principle of proportionality always applies, irrespective of the 
nature of the conflict and the qualification of the adversary.5 
While the United States does not necessarily protest the Israeli legal positions, it 
also does not wholeheartedly agree with them, capitalizing on what it sees as 
rather prominent blurred legal and ethical lines. While most international 
organizations and foreign states have made attempts to explicitly fuse drones to 
already established norms, ethics, and rules of war, the United States has focused 
more on drones being something of a semi-covert tool of political means. In other 
words, drone war is not necessarily the exact same thing as conventional war. 
Once you blur the line on this basic fundamental categorization then nearly 
everything else becomes open to interpretation, including civilian versus military, 
target classifications, proportionality, and necessity. At the moment, these 
blurred lines do not carry significant contemporary consequences because no 
other country has the level of drone development and capability as the United 
States.6  
 
The point being made here is that this ethical ‘standard’, purposely blurred and 
contextual, is potentially dangerous as the rest of the world inevitably begins to 
catch up with the United States in drone technology. Even if the overall strategy 
of the U.S. Air Force is maintained, and America remains dominant in terms of 
drone evolution and innovation, it will not resolve the possible dilemmas when 
adversarial countries have drone technology capable of being weaponized at 
                                                          
4 Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, “Legal, Political, and Ethical Dimensions of Drone 
Warfare under International Law: A Preliminary Survey,” International Criminal Law 
Review 12 (2012).  
5 Ibid, 780. 
6 After the United States, the following countries have the most pronounced drone fleets 
with the potential at least of fully-weaponized robotic technology: China; Israel; India; 
Russia; Pakistan; Iran. 
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American targets. When that development comes to pass, the United States may 
be facing difficult situations if such countries apply the same kinds of blurred 
lines to their own internal drone strategies. Consider International Human 
Rights Law: 
 
“Under international human rights law two important principles govern 
all use of force: necessity and proportionality…A state killing is legal 
only if it is required to protect life (making lethal force proportionate) 
and there is no other means, such as capture or nonlethal 
incapacitation, of preventing that threat to life (making lethal force 
necessary). A further requirement is that the threat to life which the use 
of lethal force is seeking to forestall must be imminent.”7 
 
The United States has often justified its drone attacks under the above legal 
reasoning: the inaccessibility of the targets and degree of difficulty for human 
capture operations justify drone warfare. The exact same reasoning above, 
however, could easily be applied to justify drone attacks against America in the 
future. The only reason this has not been widely debated is because the United 
States seems to over-rely on the fact that such technological thresholds seem far 
off in the future. This is not exactly a compelling ethical or legal argument as to 
why the United States should not expect in its near future to be attacked by 
foreign drones. As a recent Brookings Institute report mentioned: 
 
“To believe that drones will remain the exclusive province of responsible 
nations is to disregard a long history of weapons technology. It is only a 
matter of time before rogue groups or nations hostile to the United 
States are able to build or acquire their own drones to use them to 
launch attacks on our soil or on our soldiers abroad.”8 
 
While the above is quite prescient, it too contributes to the framing dilemma by 
automatically granting the United States the title of ‘responsible nation’. This 
dilemma, however, is not about whether America is or is not a responsible nation 
with drone technology. The larger point is that it is clearly perceived to be 
‘irresponsible’ in the eyes of those states that have fallen victim to American 
attacks.  
 
The biggest blurred line to date is targeted killing. Initially, most felt targeted 
killing to be extrajudicial and akin to summary execution or assassination. Israel 
was the biggest proponent of the practice and even the United States took a fairly 
                                                          
7 Stuart Casey-Maslen, Pandora’s Box? "Drone strikes under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, 
and human right law," International Review of the Red Cross 94:886 (Summer, 2012): 
617. 
8 Ibid, 625. 
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critical stance to Israeli strategy.9 Interestingly, after 9/11, the American position 
became more liberal on targeted killing as a tactic in fighting terrorism. States 
like America and Israel were adamant about the pervasiveness, ambiguity, and 
lethality of terrorism. Consequently, international law needed to accommodate 
targeted killing as the best modern solution to this new threat had become so 
powerful, unforeseeable, and undefined.10 The legal evolution on this issue is 
incredibly subtle and supremely advantageous to a technically dominant state: 
 
“Targeted killing is inscribed into the law in so far as a temporal criterion 
(imminence) is converted into a qualitative one (gravity). The target, as the 
one who may be lawfully killed, thus at the same time sees itself included in 
and excluded from the law. If targeted killing was thought to be 
unlegalizable—not in the face of a superior norm…but rather given the 
principle of use of force as a last resort is indeterminable in advance 
precisely because it is always bound to a singular situation requiring an 
individual decision—here, the reverse has been proved…When framed 
within the theater of war, targeted killing categorically seems to be 
justifiable under the legal principles of necessity, proportionality, 
discrimination, and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering.”11 
 
Again, most remarkable about the above legal reasoning is how important the 
continued exclusive technological dominance of the United States is in drone 
technology. The United States has a diplomatic habit of positioning its interests 
as something higher than pure foreign policy and national security priorities. In 
so doing, it creates a de facto expectation whereby it has exclusive rights to 
exceptional behavior on the global stage. The obvious risk with such diplomatic 
calisthenics is that most other countries do not grant such exclusivity or 
exceptionality to the United States and American actions are therefore seen as 
potentially precedent-setting and norm-establishing, let alone resentment-
generating.  
 
The reformulation of targeted killing so that it is both legal and vague, having 
targets both included in and excluded from the law simultaneously, is not much 
of a danger as long as the United States maintains drone technology domination. 
Cracks in that dominance, however, carry stark consequences. Perhaps most 
perplexing is how the United States does not seem to consider the impact if the 
above legal formulation about targeted killing was applied by an adversarial state 
on American targets. It is politically thin ice if American confidence is based on 
presumed continued technical dominance and a self-declared ethical normalcy. 
 
                                                          
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 678-79. 
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This perceived ethical strength is based on a rather tenuous sense of what 
constitutes ‘legal self-defense’ on the global stage. In the war against terrorism 
first begun in earnest under Bush, the United States portrayed itself as an 
innocent victim, not deserving of justified blowback, hostility, or animosity. 
There has been much written about how American foreign-policy decisions have 
heavily influenced the rise of radical groups. It is unnecessary for this article to 
summarize the massive literature on this issue. What is relevant is how blurring 
the line of legal self-defense to ethically justify drone attacks carries dangerous 
potential consequences for America: little emphasized is whether or not such 
loose interpretations of ‘self-defense’ sets problematic precedents for future 
drone holders, especially ones that were previously attacked by the United States. 
Is it truly implausible for a previously attacked state to launch an attack against 
the United States? The only reason this question is not addressed in scholarly and 
diplomatic circles today is because of two failures: first, they fail to imagine the 
day when adversarial states that have already been attacked with American 
drones will have their own drone technology capable of reaching and targeting 
American objectives and second, they believe there is great operational and 
reputational distinction across the globe between Bush and Obama. Data on 
these two factors, however, refutes this idea: Obama’s global reputation is not 
what it was in 2008 and his use of drones has been overwhelming compared to 
Bush.  
 
Thus, an incredibly slippery ethical slope has been created. For example, it has 
already been discussed in this paper how different states have wildly different 
assessments for what is proportionate or not proportionate, what is a legitimate 
target or not legitimate, and what constitutes imminent necessity as opposed to 
being not imminent. Even close military allies like the United States and United 
Kingdom have often come to different conclusions on these issues.12 It is a 
dangerous Pandora’s box one opens by establishing blurred ethical lines and 
ambiguous legal precedents as any change in the previous technological world 
order could unleash a drone era that is decidedly less friendly, less open, and 
likely more violent.  
 
As one astute observer recently noted, "too often, targeted killings by states look 
rather like crossing names off a Mafia hit list…In the final analysis, measured by 
the moral standards common to most societies, even targeted killings carried out 
within the framework of the present legal order often have traits that are more 
readily associated with criminal behavior than with acceptable government 
policy."13 Again, perception matters: the United States clearly does not want the 
rest of the world to think of its drone technology use as a highly technical Mafia 
                                                          
12 Stuart Casey-Maslen, Pandora’s Box? "Drone strikes under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, 
and human right law," International Review of the Red Cross 94:886 (Summer, 2012). 
13 Ibid. 
Crosston: Pandora's Presumption
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
 8 
 
assassin. But if asked, what would states such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
and the like consider it? What ethical standards will these states employ if they 
one day obtain highly capable, weaponized drone technology? What general 
worldwide drone trends might emerge after an era epitomized by the United 
States being a bit too subjective and lacking in transparency? The literature that 
has begun to emerge, looking critically at drones, is more focused on technical 
aspects of the discussion and thereby missing these ominous ethical 
consequences. 
 
Contrarian Voices Against Drones: Important but Incomplete 
The arguments highlighting drone complexity are diverse and compelling. The 
spectrum covers everything from power politics to legal form to covert action. 
Each piece cogently adds to the vibrancy of the debate. Interestingly, the 
fundamental point is still being missed. McDonnell, for example, focused on 
international law and whether or not a hegemonic power like the United States 
had the right to act against organizations or states that operate against American 
interests. His main concern was the overall damage that could be inflicted upon 
international norms that have been long accepted as governing armed aggression, 
namely Article 51 of the United Nations Charter or the Geneva Conventions and 
its protocols. A hegemonically powerful state with high technology, he worried, 
would be sorely tempted to use it when and where it wished regardless of how 
well it fit with accepted international norms and ethics.14 McDonnell’s point is 
utterly logical and well reasoned. It simply does not go far enough: what are the 
likely political and military consequences when the world perceives a hegemonic 
power basing its ethical norms on technical superiority alone? More importantly, 
how does the decision-making calculus of all concerned alter and change as that 
initial technical superiority becomes less pronounced and new actors gain the 
same weaponry and consider targeted killing themselves? 
 
Kels analyzed actual empirical policy under the Obama administration, looking at 
how official White House considerations were often cloaked in legal authorization 
that was basically layering discrete legal doctrines atop one another 
haphazardly.15 He showed how this approach buttressed the Obama 
administration’s claim that drone strikes were legal, ethical, and wise, but rightly 
pointed out that such terms were not automatically synonymous and that given 
policy very often could be one without being all three. Kels saw that such 
conflation offered an ‘unduly restrictive conception of targeting in war, coupled 
with an under-inclusive treatment of due process that appeared to devalue its 
                                                          
14 Thomas Michael McDonnell, "Sow What you Reap? Using Predator and Reaper Drones 
to Carry Out Assissinations or Targeted Killings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists," George 
Washington International Law Review 44 (2012). 
15 Charles G. Kels, "Law, Policy, and Drone Warfare: Mixing Legal Doctrines on Targeted 
Killing is a Dangerous Recipe for Confusion," National Law Journal 35:26 (2013). 
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meaning’.16 Consequently, American drone policy ends up assailed by defense 
hawks, human rights advocates, and libertarians simultaneously. Again, as with 
McDonnell, the issue is not with the validity or importance of these analytical 
claims but rather that they do not extend far enough out: in this case, the author 
worries more about domestic critics while ignoring the much more potentially 
violent criticism that could come from outside the United States. 
 
Kennedy dissects discussions over drone policy and whether or not there was a 
need for change. His ultimate conclusion supported the idea that without a new 
doctrine understandable to allies and adversaries alike, the United States risked 
achieving near-term tactical benefits while potentially causing its own significant 
longer-term damage to alliances, global public opinion, the war on terrorism, and 
international stability.17 A common error seen running throughout the literature 
is that the potential danger facing the United States because of its drone policy is 
self-contained and largely internal. This argument holds water only by accepting 
the continued technological dominance of the United States. If the possibility of 
weaponized drone technology proliferation is allowed (and it should be), then the 
dangers facing the United States in the future could very well be external and 
adversarial.  
 
Killmister looked at the ethical implications of remote weaponry. Rather 
uniquely, she analyzed what options were available for retaliation when the state 
comes under attack. Her focus was on three options: surrender, target enemy 
civilians, or target civilian combatants within the aggressor state. This missed a 
very important fourth choice: the purposeful and aggressive acquisition of remote 
weaponry technology. Time and again, no matter how powerful and relevant the 
analyses tend to be, scholars are missing the most logical strategic plan for those 
targeted by drones: acquire your own drones. More disconcertingly, this logic 
remains true whether discussing state or non-state actors. Killmister’s 
conclusions about the ethical implications were equally important but also 
missing a significant subtlety: 
 
“[Remote weaponry] places great strain on just war theory. We are left 
having to claim either that superior military technology engenders a 
superior moral claim, such that anyone targeted by remote weaponry is 
morally obliged to submit and/or surrender. Or we must claim that in 
situations of remote warfare, the principle of civilian immunity cannot hold. 
In such situations, remote weaponry has the consequence of rendering just 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 Greg Kennedy, "Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism," Parameters 42:4/43:1 
(Winter-Spring, 2013). 
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war theory either an ally of the powerful or obsolete. This internal tension is 
an aspect of remote weaponry that as yet remains undertheorized.”18 
 
This astute commentary is the closest to recognizing the long-term battlefield 
consequences of current drone warfare thinking. Though formally denied by the 
United States government, there can be no question that victim states of drones 
feel quite strongly that the United States can ‘claim’ the moral high ground 
simply because it has exclusive ownership of superior military technology. More 
damaging, such states inevitably feel that just war theory is no longer equally 
applied to all states but has become something of a tool to be utilized and 
manipulated only by the most powerful. The above quote showed how the 
scholarly world had yet to engage this internal conflict. This article would rather 
emphasize how much this internal tension ends up impacting external conflict in 
coming drone wars and how ‘inappropriately’ drone technology may be used in 
retaliation. Again, the precedents set by the United States based on its technical 
dominance become problematic and dangerous when the technological playing 
field becomes more level. Most importantly, too many in this debate are drawing 
too sharp a dichotomy between state vs. non-state targets. Since American 
counter-terrorist drone operations emphasize the targeting and killing of non-
state actors, many believe there are no real consequences to worry about from 
state actors. This belies the reality of drone strikes, which inevitably kill dozens if 
not hundreds of civilians in collateral damage, in addition to the financial 
devastation inflicted to infrastructure. Inside of America, there is an inaccurate 
mythology about the pristine neatness of drone strikes that is not shared or 
sympathized with by states in which drone attacks occur. Therefore, this article 
might be the first to make a connection between the political/military 
consequences in state actors’ thinking because of drone strikes against non-state 
actors within their territory.  
 
Johansson examined the moral right to use UAVs in war. Her chief concern dealt 
with the military advantages of UAVs and how they might lead to secret wars 
with the commensurate lack of transparency.19 As has been discussed earlier in 
this article, she considered that the employment of intelligence agencies to be 
involved in targeted killing with very few clear rules of engagement was ethically 
compromised. Though this argument is somewhat tautological given the nature 
of intelligence operations writ large, she considered how questions about civilian 
intelligence agencies using UAVs could be less relevant in less democratic 
societies since such societies tended to have very little transparency in their 
                                                          
18 Suzy Killmister, "Remote Weaponry: The Ethical Implications," Journal of Applied 
Psychology 25:2 (2008): 122. 
19 Linda Johansson, "Is it Morally Right to Use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in 
War?" Philosophy of Technology Journal (June, 2011). 
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governments and military organs as well.20 Though Johansson doesn’t appear to 
recognize it, her argument further builds the foundation for retaliatory 
irresponsible behavior on the part of states most often attacked by drones. If the 
technological playing field is made more equitable, then there is no reason to 
expect rational behavior or considerate action on the part of nondemocratic 
states that have acquired weaponized drone technology. At least, such things 
should not be expected with the American precedent of perfunctory ethical norms 
justifying drone warfare. 
 
While it is by no means scholarly and comes from a more emotional perspective, 
the growing literature out of Pakistan on drone targeting and attacks is impactful. 
Khalid Iqbal has emerged as the most eloquent voice in this din of protest: 
 
“Drones are terrorizing an entire civilian population; they live under the 
constant threat of annihilation. People hear them day and night. Parents are 
afraid to send their children to school. Women are afraid to go to markets. 
Families are afraid to gather at funerals for people wrongly killed in earlier 
strikes. Drivers are afraid to deliver food from other parts of the country. 
The routines of daily life have been ripped to shreds. Indisputably innocent 
people cower in their homes, afraid to assemble on the streets. Double taps, 
or secondary strikes on the same target, have stopped residents from aiding 
those who need immediate medical attention.”21 
 
What powerful commentaries like this attest to is the unfortunate probability that 
current policy on American drones does not intimidate targeted nations but may 
actually incite a passion for vengeance and retaliation even when American 
drone action is exclusively focused on non-state actors. This flies directly in the 
face of American military and intelligence branding, which emphasizes how 
drones are capable of killing the enemy faster than they can grow them back.22  
 
The chief relevance is not in the technical efficiency of drones or their powerful 
capability to eliminate targets. What the literature tends to miss is the building 
up of a massive amount of legal, diplomatic, political, ethical, and military 
resentment brought about by an American belief in ethical justification 
maintained flimsily by technical prowess and an expectation of not being 
challenged on internal contradictions and inconsistencies. This is not a liberal 
plea to eliminate drones or handcuff U.S. power. It is, however, a warning to 
these missed dangers emergent from technological arrogance and ethical self-
indulgence. 
                                                          
20 Ibid.  
21 Khalid Iqbal, “Futility of Drone Attacks,” Defence Journal (2013). 
22 Joseph Pugliese, "Prosthetics of Law and the Atomic Violence of Drones," Griffith Law 
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These dangers do not disappear even when examining academic and diplomatic 
projects aimed at bringing drone technology under more universally standardized 
ethical norms. One such impressive project is highlighted below to show the 
difficulty that exists in trying to overcome drone ambiguity and opacity. The 
Center for Civilians in Conflict Report, produced by the Columbia University 
Law School, released a comprehensive, multi-tiered analysis on the unexamined 
costs and questions related to the civilian impact of drones. Logically divided into 
four main sub-headings, giving advice to the Obama administration, the CIA, the 
Department of Defense, and Congress, the Center’s recommendations seem to 
overwhelmingly imply not only a lack of transparency and accountability in 
American drone warfare, but there is a surprisingly large need for greater inter-
agency and inter-branch coordination and communication:23 
 
To the Obama administration: 
• Establish a special interagency task force to evaluate covert drone 
operations and make recommendations to the president on the following 
issues: 
o The extent of civilian casualties and the larger impact on civilian 
communities 
o The sufficiency of civilian protection mechanisms, including civilian 
casualty mitigation processes 
o The adequacy of civilian protection standards for the identification of 
targets, especially where there is limited to U.S. ground presence 
o Capabilities and limitations of drone technology for reducing and 
accurately assessing civilian harm 
o The existence and sufficiency of post-strike assessments and 
investigations of who was killed 
o The existence and sufficiency of processes for recognizing harm in 
making amends to civilian victims of drone strikes, their families, and 
communities 
o The strategic value and humanitarian impact of covert drone strikes 
compared to other counterterrorism approaches 
 
To the CIA: 
• Publicly describe the agency’s civilian protection mechanisms, including 
civilian casualty mitigation processes and post-strike investigatory 
procedures 
                                                          
23 Shah, Naurren et al., The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered 
Questions, Center for Civilians in Conflict Report (New York: Columbia University Law 
School, 2012). 
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• Engage with civil society regarding legal standards for targeting 
operations; confirm whether the agency regards itself as bound by 
international law and publicly describe CIA’s legal standards or who may 
be targeted 
• Disclose the steps the agency takes to train personnel involved in drone 
operations, including lawyers, on applicable laws and related civilian 
protection and harm response tactics and procedures 
 
To the Department of Defense, Special Operations Command, and Joint Special 
Operations Command: 
• Acknowledge that JSOC has a role in drone strikes outside of Afghanistan; 
declassify information on drone targeting operations once they are 
completed; and efficiently provide information on the impact of 
operations on civilians as is done by the military in traditional combat 
theaters 
• Publicly describe the civilian protection mechanisms, including civilian 
casualty mitigation processes and post-strike investigatory procedures 
• Clarify whether directions, rules, and manuals in relation to civilian 
protection and use of force compliance that are a matter of Department 
of Defense-wide policy also apply to JSOC operations, including 
operations conducted under the CIA statutory authority 
 
To Congress: 
• Exercise oversight powers to the fullest extent possible in reviewing and 
evaluating the following issues: 
o The extent of civilian casualties from covert drone strikes in the larger 
impact on civilian communities, including destruction of homes and 
displacement, and retaliatory violence by local groups 
o The sufficiency of civilian protection mechanisms employed by the 
CIA and JSOC, including civilian casualty mitigation processes 
o The adequacy of standards for the identification of targets, including 
the reliability of signatures, and the sufficiency of intelligence sources 
and analysis with limited U.S. ground presence 
o The capabilities and limitations of drone technology for reducing 
civilian harm, and the adequacy of current technology testing and 
personnel training 
o The existence and sufficiency of post-strike assessments and 
investigations that determine who was killed, including the 
characterization of military-age males as presumptively non-civilian 
o The existence and sufficiency of processes for recognizing harm in 
making amends to civilian victims of covert drone strikes, their 
families, and communities 
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o The strategic value and humanitarian impact of covert drone strikes 
compared to alternative approaches to counterterrorism 
o For joint CIA-JSOC operations, the adequacy of oversight 
mechanisms; the delineation of responsibilities between the 
organizations, and the adequacy of agency accountability for civilian 
protection and harm response24 
o  
The italicized sections belong to this author and highlight more emphatically 
what seems to be the absence of rudimentary and fundamental oversight, 
assessment, evaluation, and efficiency testing for technology that has arguably 
become the most heavily relied upon counterterrorist tool in the American 
arsenal. The report implies, for example, that it is not necessarily known if there 
are any accurate reporting tools for civilian casualties, whether any post-
operational success programs are in place, how often alternative resolutions are 
sought or utilized as opposed to drone strikes, whether JSOC respects the 
standard DoD compliance rules that have been in place for decades, or even if the 
Central Intelligence Agency, when using drones, considers itself beholden to 
international law. Most public debates about drones tend to focus on the 
President or the CIA. What the Columbia review clearly establishes is an absence 
of clarity and definition across all four major deliberative bodies that are the 
main stakeholders governing drone activity and how American drone policy 
should develop and evolve.  
 
Just as with the literature review, the above policy review testifies to how much 
current American drone utilization is predicated upon the exclusive and 
exceptional ability of the United States to dictate terms to all other countries and 
to strive to maintain such technical dominance on in perpetuity, thereby 
eliminating the need to be concerned about the lack of uniformity, transparency, 
and logical consistency in its ethical frameworks. It is true that drones are not 
solely utilized for counter-terrorist operations and activities. They operate in 
conventional military operations, border security, peacekeeping, even anti-
poaching. This article is not trying to conflate drone usage exclusively with 
counter-terrorism. But it is important to note the distinction that drone 
operations in these other arenas seem to not suffer from the same inconsistent 
application of ethics and norms. Instead, the focus is on the area that specifically 
illustrates the potential of creating more serious future problems for the United 
States. A cursory investigation reveals just how dangerous these problems could 
be: 2013 seemed to be a stellar year for drone achievement around the world with 
pronounced possible military/counter-terrorist applications. 
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Drone Life: Gadgets and Government with Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) 
The Obama strategy in terms of using drones is focused primarily on 
counterterrorism. This strategy deals with hindering non-state groups like al-
Qaida, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and now the Islamic State, in countries where 
there has not been an official American declaration of war against the state. 
Drone warfare has not been so much under the military’s sole purview, but placed 
under the authority of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the CIA.25 
Efficiency and speed seem to dictate authority and responsibility controls. 
Robotic warfare is clearly the next great step in the evolution of military force 
action. Up to now, the United States clearly favors the argument of drones 
seamlessly fitting into current American rules of engagement. While official 
policy emphasizes this position, there can be no doubt of the dramatic strategic 
impact drone warfare has had on U.S. thinking.26 To that end there has been 
great focus on the training of UAV operators and how they must take constant 
care to spare civilians and civilian objects, to fit drone technology into status quo 
rules of engagement.27  
 
“He must do everything practicable or practically possible to verify that the 
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are 
not subject to special protection but are military objectives; he must take all 
practicable or practically possible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian 
objects; he must refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be 
expected to cause disproportionate incidental civilian injury and/or 
damage; he must cancel or suspend the attack if it becomes clear that its 
objective is not a military objective, that its objective is subject to special 
protection or that the attack may be expected to cause disproportionate 
incidental civilian injury or damage.”28 
 
All of this sounds rational and considerate. The United States focuses on the 
increasingly subtle and comprehensive data collection techniques available to 
UAV planners and operational decision-makers. In essence, questions that were 
once considered dependent on field observation are now considered manageable 
from any distance and location thanks to the advanced capabilities of technology. 
                                                          
25 Leila Hudson, and Colin S. Owens and David J. Callen, “Drone Warfare in Yemen: 
Fostering Emirates through Counterterrorism?” Middle East Policy Council XIX:3 (Fall, 
2012).  
26 Ibid.  
27 William Boothby, “Some Legal Challenges by Remote Attack,” International Review of 
the Red Cross 94:886 (Summer, 2012). 
28 Ibid. 
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This does leave open a significant vulnerability. If the equipment functions 
properly and all information-gathering data is applied accurately, then any 
unnecessary damage and casualties are pilot error, making him culpable.29 The 
United States disagrees, however: 
 
“If for example the data feeds to the controller were adversely affected by a 
system fault, and if that fault can properly be said to have caused the 
erroneous decision to attack, then the system failure is likely to exonerate 
the controller from responsibility for the attack. Similarly, if the opposing 
party to the conflict, whether through ruses, perfidy, voluntary or 
involuntary human shielding or otherwise, materially impedes the platform 
operators task, that will also be affected to take into account when 
determining responsibility for the resulting events. It would not seem to be 
reasonable to lay blame at the door of the operator for errors attributable 
to the supporting systems, enemy action or other causes beyond his 
control.”30 (Emphasis mine) 
 
There are two pronounced logic flaws in the above argumentation. First, on the 
issue of system faults, the United States has basically crafted a technological 
version of having one’s cake and eating it too: America capitalizes on its 
technologically innovative war-making capacity, rightly declares greater success 
because of that innovation, but then says any mistakes are purely technical and 
therefore all human operators are absolved of responsibility. No axiom is more 
telling in the 21st century drone age than technology being both a blessing and a 
curse: a blessing because of the huge advantages and greater efficiencies it creates 
and a curse because every technological system ultimately breaks down, misfires, 
or becomes compromised. For the U.S. to grant human absolution on technical 
error, when its position is dependent upon technology that is inevitably prone to 
error is, to say the least, rather cavalier. Especially given in this context such 
cavalier attitude is in fact dismissing the damage, destruction, or devastation of 
foreign civilian property and life. 
 
Second, drone operators can be absolved of responsibility based on enemy 
action. This logic is faulty as it basically states the only way a drone operator 
could be found culpable for error would be if the enemy stood completely still and 
waited to be hit by drone fire and instead nearby civilians were hit. It is 
incredulous to think current American policy, in terms of shielding drone 
operators from judgment, is based on the principle that the enemy must not fight 
back. If the enemy engages or attempts to counter the drone objective, then the 
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drone operator is no longer responsible for any consequential damage or loss of 
life. 
 
In basic terms, there is nothing unique behind drone warfare. The idea of 
creating weapons that allow you to fight from a distance, thereby lessening your 
own risk, has existed since the beginning of time. In some ways the cannon, 
crossbow, artillery, and air bombardment were all Revolutions in Military Affairs 
(RMAs) that accomplished the same principle.31 UAVs function in the same way. 
Therefore, the fallacious contemporary criticism of drone technology is that it 
allows the United States to kill people from a much greater distance. The problem 
is in formulating drone ethics that are highly irregular, logically fallacious, and 
somewhat contradictory. Taking advantage of technical dominance is not an 
unwise strategy for any state. But it might be ultimately unwise to develop an 
ethical position with such technological domination that gives the United States 
carte blanche authority to utilize the technology without consequence. 
 
This is more readily apparent with how the CIA has its own division operating 
drones. There are some unique aspects to the principle of distinction within 
international humanitarian law when it comes to CIA drone use. The principle of 
distinction requires participants in an armed conflict to differentiate themselves 
from civilians and demands that attackers distinguish between lawful targets and 
civilian targets. This basic principle is the core of international humanitarian law. 
The debate has raged within the scholarly community for some time now on what 
the status of CIA drone operators should be, whether lawful combatants or 
unprivileged belligerents. Gary Solis has argued most powerfully for the latter 
case: 
 
“CIA agents are, unlike their military counterparts but like the fighters they 
target, unlawful combatants. No less than their insurgent targets, they are 
fighters without uniforms or insignia, directly participating in hostilities, 
employing armed forces contrary to the laws and customs of war. Even if 
they are sitting in Langley, the CIA pilots are civilians violating the 
requirement of distinction, a core concept of armed conflict, as they directly 
participate in hostilities. It makes no difference that CIA civilians are 
employed by, or in the service of, the U.S. Government or its Armed Forces. 
They are civilians…They directly participate in hostilities, which means they 
may be lawfully targeted.”32 
 
Michael Lewis and Emily Crawford astutely point out that wearing or not wearing 
military uniforms is a misguided focus. The legal purpose for wearing uniforms is 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 
32 Michael Lewis and Emily Crawford, “Drones and Distinction: How IHL encouraged the 
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to ensure that during active hostilities the combatant is readily distinguishable 
from the civilian population.33 The bigger issue for Lewis and Crawford is 
whether or not the CIA can and does in fact enforce laws of war through its own 
chain of command. If CIA drone operators are combatants, then they are entitled 
to combatants’ privilege but also eligible to be targeted at all times. If they are 
unprivileged belligerents, then they could potentially face domestic criminal 
prosecution in those places where they operate.34 This is a fascinating discussion 
in and of itself, as it follows on the traditions inherent to Article 4 of the Geneva 
Convention dealing with prisoners of war. While it is unfortunately beyond the 
scope of the present article, it is undoubtedly yet another angle for investigating 
problematic national security futures when it comes to American drone 
operations. 
 
What accomplished scholars like Solis, Lewis, and Crawford fail to emphasize is 
how ultimately irrelevant the principle of distinction and international 
humanitarian law likely is when it comes to the CIA conducting its drone 
operations or how it views the rules for drone operators. The non-transparent 
nature of intelligence and the safely-assumed violation of state sovereignty for 
intelligence operations in the field means that the CIA is unlikely to support 
greater oversight and governance for a weapon that helps it accomplish its 
mission objectives efficiently. The U.S. military has extensive procedures and 
protocols to establish proper targeting and to assist in making decisions about 
legal calculations. The CIA, however, either does not have such explicit 
methodology or it simply refuses to reveal what its methodology actually is.35 The 
CIA will likely want to utilize drones in whatever ways it sees fit. If that requires it 
to circumvent, violate, or operate outside of the general boundaries and norms of 
international humanitarian law (IHL), then one should expect the IHL to be 
circumvented, violated, and operated around. People should not dismiss how this 
is the basic essence of espionage. This article is not attempting to moralize on 
such positions. Rather, it is trying to show how such cavalier positions, based 
more so on American technical dominance today rather than any superior ethical 
or legal foundation for tomorrow, demand that researchers ask an awkward 
question: what happens when the drone playing field is not so heavily slanted 
toward the American side? 
 
Catching up in the International Drone Race 
Italy 
Late in 2013, Selex EX, in partnership with Piaggio Aero, conducted a successful 
test flight to confirm proper functioning of the Italian UAV Remote Vehicle 
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Control/ Management System and the Ground Control Station.36 This 
advancement was based upon already existing Italian software and is designed 
for control and surveillance missions. It has data fusion, data management, and 
video exploitation features that are capable of operating missions as diverse as 
border control, wide-area surveillance, environmental data collection, and 
disaster control.37 Nicknamed the Hammerhead, it can carry a variety of payloads 
and seems to be mostly destined at the moment for maritime patrol, given Italian 
domestic security concerns with its massive coastline. The possibility of 
expanding capability and capacity remains likely as the respective CEOs of this 
joint venture boasted about opportunities in 2015 that could gain them primary 
position in the international surveillance and security industry.38 
 
Pakistan 
Late in 2013, after years of preparation and strategic planning, the chief of 
Pakistan’s military formally announced the successful launch of Pakistan’s first 
domestically produced UAVs. The drones, called Burraq and Shahpar, are at 
present unarmed and to be used only for surveillance according to military 
officials.39 Both Pakistani and Western analysts have confirmed how much the 
development of the drones represents a milestone for the country’s military and 
science community. Pakistan is arguably the state with the most up-close-and-
personal empirical experience when it comes to using drones on its territory. The 
issue for Pakistan was that this use was conducted only by the United States, 
beginning immediately after the 9/11 attacks under then President George W. 
Bush. At the time, President Musharraf asked Bush to supply drone technology to 
his country. The United States declined (not surprising, given the fact discussed 
in this article that the entire point of American drone policy is maintain 
dominance and superiority for as long as possible and deter drone technology 
proliferation as much as it can). This set off Pakistan’s own homegrown effort to 
develop such technology. The present Pakistani drones have a range of about 
seventy-five miles, and do not carry weapons payloads. Experts, however, are 
quick to point out that the type of drone developed by Pakistan (surveillance 
models) a relatively easy to convert to an armed version, though they will not 
have the same precision as American models.40 
                                                          
36 Francis X. Govers III , “Hammerhead UAV takes to the skies over Italy,” Gizmag, 
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37 Ibid. 
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39 Tim Craig, “Pakistan Unveils its Own Military Drones, as Protests Continue against US 
Attacks,” Washington Post, Dec 2, 2013, available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistan-unveils-its-own-
military-drones-as-protests-continue-against-us-attacks/2013/11/25/fae691cc-5607-
11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html.  
40 Ibid. 
Crosston: Pandora's Presumption
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
 20 
 
 
China 
China is not new to the drone technology market. It has operated its own drones 
for many years. In 2013, however, China established a new level in the evolution 
of foreign drone technology when it unveiled the Lijian, claiming it to be the first 
successfully flown ‘stealth drone’ not originating from the United States.41 The 
fact that this Chinese drone has remarkably similar design contours to the 
Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel and the Northrop Grumman X-47B raises 
questions about the ability of the American military-industrial complex to keep 
secret technology secret. Unlike other countries pursuing their own drone 
technology, China offers no denial that this drone in particular is meant to be an 
unmanned ground attack aircraft, fully weaponized and employable at great 
distances.42 Designed by the Shengyeng Aircraft Design Institute and 
manufactured by the Hongdu Aviation Industry Group, political authorities 
boasted after the flight that this drone was proof that China had again narrowed 
the air-power disparity between itself and Western nations.43 Interestingly, 
American officials admitted that the inaugural flight of a stealth drone in China 
was indeed a big step, but they denied this drone could carry the potential of 
being a balance-shifter since the long-term efficiency of the design remains 
unproven. Since increased proficiency and intensified efficiency is basically an 
irrefutable axiom when it comes to the development of technology across the 
globe, what immediately comes to mind is whether this opinion represents astute 
analysis or merely wishful political thinking. 
 
South Africa 
The Cape Town-based company KND Naval Design, participating in the Dubai air 
show for the first time in 2013, earned a $30 million order for its newly produced 
UAVs. It also signed a letter of intent with a Russian company for a similar deal 
worth an additional $20 million. Discussions are serious enough between KND 
and Russia that there are expectations it may establish a second production 
facility in Russian territory.44 Just as with the Italian initiatives, South Africa 
focuses at the moment primarily on maritime operations, although executives are 
already developing marketing promotions for a variety of other applications 
including wildlife surveillance, geological mapping, aerial photography, news 
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coverage, traffic control, crowd surveillance, pipeline and power line monitoring, 
and other as yet undefined military applications.45  
 
South Africa is actually one of the leading industrial states pushing the technical 
boundaries of UAV performance, believing flights of over 4000 miles and heights 
of nearly 45,000 feet will become regular standards for the leading companies. It 
is important to note that at the present time the United States prides itself as 
being the only country capable of developing drones with such technical prowess. 
South Africa also seems to be paving the way for creating a legitimate 
transnational industrial market that will de facto proliferate drone technology to 
countries presently absent such capability. In other words, states do not need to 
depend on their own homegrown industries in order to be viable in the drone age. 
As ever more members join the drone club, the precedents established by the 
drone leader are going to be relevant.  
 
Islamic Crescent and American Drone ‘Wishful Thinking’ 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) actually succeeded in destroying a drone that it 
tracked flying over sensitive military installations and was approaching the 
Dimona nuclear reactor in 2013. The drone was unarmed but was operated by 
agents elsewhere and attempting to relay images back to a home base. Israelis 
have not disclosed whether or not that enemy objective was successful but they 
were certain that the drone was not American, Chinese, or Russian. IDF claimed 
it to be an Iranian drone that was assembled in Lebanon and flown by 
Hezbollah.46 These are the new facts of life when it comes to global drone 
production: it is too easy to obtain, the barriers for entry on the production side 
are crumbling far too quickly, and more and more countries see UAV production 
as an incredibly lucrative business too tempting to pass up. More than seventy-
five countries have some type of remote piloted aircraft, with unique drone types 
now numbering near 1000.47  
 
In some ways, the era that this article warns of may already be here. Consider: 
Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a legal strike on anti-Syrian 
forces inside of Syria; Russia picks off militants that are getting uncomfortably 
close to oil and gas pipelines in Ukraine, Georgia, and southern Russian; Turkey 
utilizes a Predator drone, provided by the United States, to kill Kurdish militants 
in northern Iraq.48 Having watched American military and intelligence 
operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan for the last decade, critically 
important global players like Iran, Russia, China and Turkey have come to 
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understand that the justification to use drones is basically granted once you are 
able to label a target as terrorist.49 
 
In response to this proliferation of not only drone technology but drone 
capability, American officials have slowly and subtly altered their overall position. 
Whereas in the past the United States was secure in having an overwhelmingly 
dominant technical superiority over any and all potential rivals and allies alike, it 
now claims that technology distribution is not capable of undermining American 
dominance. What truly fuels American global drone power is the unparalleled 
intelligence-collection and data-analysis that underpins American capability.50 
On the one hand, this is very true: China doesn’t intend to develop drones in 
order to attack Cameroon. Turkey has no desire to carry out lethal strikes against 
the citizens of Finland. As such, states that are now aggressively pushing the 
acquisition of drone technology are seeking drone capabilities of a decidedly 
more local and regional flavor. What seems dangerously myopic on the part of 
the United States is how it seems to be building its comfort level by telling itself 
adversarial national security interests are not ever going to be global or focused 
on America. An ethical system that justifies unethical behavior as long as it is 
locally contained is not a system capable of peaceful survival.  
 
This is what the author finds akin to drone ‘wishful thinking’. The United States 
sees what it wants to see and hopes no one else bothers to notice what it is 
purposely ignoring. To wit: the United States does not want other states to have 
drone technology, until they do. Then it is not about the technology but about the 
truly global technical strike capabilities. The United States does not want others 
to have truly global technical strike capabilities, until they do. Then it is not about 
such strike capacity, but about the intelligence and data-collection techniques. 
The United States does not want others to have highly sophisticated and adept 
intelligence and data-collection techniques, until they do. Then it is not about 
such information-collection talent, but about the fact that no one wants to use it 
to strike the United States.  
 
This is where such wishful thinking falls apart. The United States has developed 
weaponized drone technology. It has made legal discussions about drone norms 
and ethics opaque and arbitrary. It has employed drone attacks in some cases 
outside the conventional rules of engagement and laws of war. To believe that no 
country would ever have a desire to use the same technology against America, 
American interests, or American allies seems to be founded upon nothing. This is 
not diplomatic idealism. It is political fantasy.  
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Such subtle fantasy is so pervasively cloaked in quasi-intellectual legitimacy that 
it can make such highly-respected and august bodies like the Council on Foreign 
Relations and the Brookings Institution fall victim to its charms: both have come 
out recently to emphasize how ‘quickly the window of opportunity is closing’ for 
the United States to establish stability-supporting precedent and clear universal 
norms on drone development and usage.51 This qualifies as the aforementioned 
wishful thinking because it presumes the rest of the global community won’t be 
able to recognize this for what it is: the need for stable precedents and universal 
ethical norms became necessary to America only when America was no longer 
the only dominant possessor of the technology.  
 
Hopefully, the United States will not be too blinded or surprised when such 
requests for stability fall on somewhat reluctant and unmotivated foreign ears. 
The United States will likely always be the best developer of drone technology 
and does indeed have the greatest support system for them. This does not, 
however, mean it will never be at risk to the ‘lesser’ drone achievements of 
adversaries in the field. 
  
Conclusion 
“Remote weaponry has illuminated a stress in just war theory that runs 
deep. Technological and military superiority seems to preclude the waging 
of a just war. It does not allow the opposition to engage warfare in 
accordance with the principle of jus in bello despite having a just cause. It 
does create a situation that is morally unacceptable.”52 
 
The United States earned a technical dominance in the twenty-first century when 
it developed a massive fleet of UAVs unmatched by any other country in the 
world. The time to establish stability-inducing legal standards and universally 
accepted ethical norms would have been during the peak of that domination. 
Nothing would appear more powerful to the weak than when the strong 
voluntarily constrains itself for the betterment of all. There is no surprise that the 
United States did not pursue such magnanimity on the global stage. Drone 
technology is a remote weapon meant to increase lethality for targets and 
decrease risk for operators. It is a powerful technical drug.  
 
What cannot be avoided with such decisions, however, are the blowback 
consequences when the technological playing field inevitably becomes more level. 
The ease-of-use for deploying drones and the decreased danger for attackers 
mean that drones will inevitably be pursued by the military and intelligence 
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communities of other countries. Most would say this development signals the 
erosion of humanitarian and human rights law.53 As such, the international 
community wants to see more critical questions that foster higher ethics and 
rigorous research to help decrease tension and minimize greater violence.54  
 
This is an admirable quest. Unfortunately, the military and intelligence 
communities of the United States, while being the clear leaders in this field 
technically, logistically, and operationally, have severely compromised the seat of 
moral leadership they assume should be exclusively theirs. Pandora’s 
presumption is the premise that America is relying too heavily on its continued 
drone dominance and not thinking about the empirical ethical lessons it is 
setting for the rest of the world when it comes to technology, war, and the rules of 
engagement. America will likely remain the dominant player in drone capability, 
but not the sole player in the drone arena. That is an important difference. Not 
planning for that eventuality means America will likely have to seek novel 
strategies to counter countries that join the drone club with, quite frankly, an axe 
to grind. This is no small dilemma: the biggest concern behind Pandora’s 
presumption is that the United States will have to cope with a future where it was 
responsible for bringing its own technological chickens home to ethically roost. If 
this happens, then it will only be to the detriment of American national security.  
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